Searle on Intentionality[i]
Firstly let’s define the terms of the title: intentionality and Searle general position according to what Ronald McIntyre [ii] said in the intro of his article. Intentionality is the apparently relational property wherein certain mental states (e.g. perceptions and beliefs) are characterized as being ‘of’ or ‘about’ objects of various sorts, especially extra-mental things and states of affairs. Searle is a physicalist but not a reductionist [iii] . For him, Intentionality is an ‘intrinsic’ feature of certain mental states but cannot ultimately be explained away. However, ‘Intentional states are both caused by and realized in the structure of the brain’. Also Intentionality is crucial for developing a theory of mind , including belief, perception, intentional action, causality, meaning, and reference. Especially here in this post our intention is to understand, from McIntyre, the relation between Husserl and Searle. Husserl called intentionality ‘the principal theme of phenom