Investigating the world

We learn from neuroscientist the correlations between physical and conscious states but we do not learn about consciousness itself. That is because a physical description is not able to say what consciousness is (we can’t get it out). If a reducible description is valid for other areas of science, this is not true for consciousness. Since Aristotle passing through seventeen century, the science reduced the description of the phenomenon in terms of matter and motion. Matter is one thing that has a structure that can be mathematically described but consciousness not (so far). Scientific description of matter is just describing certain properties of matter that can be described mathematically. Not all parts of matter can be captured this way. Exactly the consciousness is not possible to be described this way. The way we know that matter is completely different the consciousness is – it is only known by us internally. For Rebecca, there is no chance for our science to move on and le

Dennett is saying here that there are thousands and thousands of things reaching us since the time we wake up and he considers these things like micro judgments. These things can be colors, emotions, etc. However, are they processed consciously by us? All these things happen in a chain of events where the precedent can influence the next one and over this we have a kind of notion about what is going on in the world. Dennett calls this stream of consciousness where we have all the events competing for the attention of the brain and over many channels (ear, nose, mouth, etc.). So, in such time, a kind of event reaches the top – what Dennett named fame [= consciousness]. On the other hands, there is an illusion, according to Dennett, that we are very right or confident about our decisions and willing – he approximates this to the Cartesian view of the things. So, there is not a place in the brain where our decisions are located and from where we could have a domain of everything or

In the beginning of the interview, RLK [ii] drove Thalia to agree that philosophers need to take neuroscientists into consideration when arguing over free will. I know that is difficult for neuroscientist to compatible a biological plausible theory that deals with billions of neurons because they know “the terms” (how the brain works, etc…). Thalia says that is not possible to put the physical system together the free will based on her experiments that have showed that neuroscientist can cause action in patients without they have the sense of free will, so this sense is an illusion or whatever. In her experiments with some “games”, individuals made something without the feeling of will or she put electrons in their arms that excited their hands to do movements, decoupling the feeling of action, decision, behavior. Or, she dissociated the feeling of doing from the action of doing . The implication is that the feeling of doing is not relevant, but why do we need this feeling? For