Posts

Searle on Intentionality[i]

Firstly let’s define the terms of the title: intentionality and Searle general position according to what Ronald McIntyre [ii] said in the intro of his article. Intentionality is the apparently relational property wherein certain mental states (e.g. perceptions and beliefs) are characterized as being ‘of’ or ‘about’ objects of various sorts, especially extra-mental things and states of affairs. Searle is a physicalist but not a reductionist [iii] . For him, Intentionality is an ‘intrinsic’ feature of certain mental states but cannot ultimately be explained away. However, ‘Intentional states are both caused by and realized in the structure of the brain’. Also Intentionality is crucial for developing a theory of mind , including belief, perception, intentional action, causality, meaning, and reference. Especially here in this post our intention is to understand, from McIntyre, the relation between Husserl and Searle. Husserl called intentionality ‘the principal theme of phenom

Forget to learn about consciousness for a while[i]

We learn from neuroscientist the correlations between physical and conscious states but we do not learn about consciousness itself. That is because a physical description is not able to say what consciousness is (we can’t get it out). If a reducible description is valid for other areas of science, this is not true for consciousness. Since Aristotle passing through seventeen century, the science reduced the description of the phenomenon in terms of matter and motion. Matter is one thing that has a structure that can be mathematically described but consciousness not (so far). Scientific description of matter is just describing certain properties of matter that can be described mathematically. Not all parts of matter can be captured this way. Exactly the consciousness is not possible to be described this way. The way we know that matter is completely different the consciousness is – it is only known by us internally. For Rebecca, there is no chance for our science to move on and le

The Equator Line[i]

Dennett is saying here that there are thousands and thousands of things reaching us since the time we wake up and he considers these things like micro judgments. These things can be colors, emotions, etc. However, are they processed consciously by us? All these things happen in a chain of events where the precedent can influence the next one and over this we have a kind of notion about what is going on in the world. Dennett calls this stream of consciousness where we have all the events competing for the attention of the brain and over many channels (ear, nose, mouth, etc.). So, in such time, a kind of event reaches the top – what Dennett named fame [= consciousness]. On the other hands, there is an illusion, according to Dennett, that we are very right or confident about our decisions and willing – he approximates this to the Cartesian view of the things. So, there is not a place in the brain where our decisions are located and from where we could have a domain of everything or

Decoupling the decision[i]

In the beginning of the interview, RLK [ii] drove Thalia to agree that philosophers need to take neuroscientists into consideration when arguing over free will. I know that is difficult for neuroscientist to compatible a biological plausible theory that deals with billions of neurons because they know “the terms” (how the brain works, etc…). Thalia says that is not possible to put the physical system together the free will based on her experiments that have showed that neuroscientist can cause action in patients without they have the sense of free will, so this sense is an illusion or whatever. In her experiments with some “games”, individuals made something without the feeling of will or she put electrons in their arms that excited their hands to do movements, decoupling the feeling of action, decision, behavior. Or, she dissociated the feeling of doing from the action of doing . The implication is that the feeling of doing is not relevant, but why do we need this feeling? For

Is there afterlife?[i]

After Eben Alexander [ii] has a comma experience when he sees “the other side of the life” he discovered consciousness is more than a “little voice in the head”. As a neurosurgeon he knows there are parts in the brain that generates the voice in the head, thoughts, linguistic human brain (ego and self), parts that are responsible for the speech production and interpretation. However, Eben states that they are small regions, tinny aspects of the cortex and are not consciousness at all. Even though, t hey are the awareness part of us, that knows the Universe and existence. For him, the hard problem of consciousness, that philosophers of Mind and neuroscientist pursue, will not be achieved. The more the neuroscientist study and know the physical brain the more they realize the physical brain is not the creator of the consciousness. To defend this view he points out common observed clinical phenomenon where dement patients near death can have very clear thinking, interaction and g

The consciousness of the Universe[i]

In this short video, Rupert Sheldrake criticizes the mind´s concept of the materialism and defends a kind of universal consciousness, but in layers. Robert Lawrence Kuhn starts saying that the brain scientists, like neurophysiologists and neuroscientists are materialists and they are argue that consciousness is a (purely) product of the human brain (driven from the physical world). Sheldrake answers asking how this is possible... would the consciousness come from nowhere? This sounds unconvincing for him and, more than that, this way we would live in a world strictly physical and without free will. It is a bizarre philosophy, in his words. For Sheldrake consciousness is involved in choice and, as a matter of fact, it is a tiny part of all our unconsciousness processes (the vast majority of what we do). So, consciousness enables different possibilities to be handled together. Rupert believes that every system in the nature that has possibilities and is not fixed can have consci

The soul is just a function*

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Putman talks about the contribution of Computer Science to Philosophy of Mind in terms of thinking the mind as a kind of function rather than physical or chemistry. He says that the rise of computers could result in everything being explained in terms of machines but the paradox is that it didn´t contribute for this kind of reductionism . Generally, according to Putman, when we work with computer we think in its programs, instructions, rules, etc., and we ignore the hardware. Ironically, he says that there is an emergency (not violating the laws of physics) where we work in a high level of the organization, in the program level. So we can think in the mind the same way: instead of thinking we are spirit inboded would be better think in the relation between the mind and the body in terms of functions. * Short digest of short interisting vídeo: https://youtu.be/m0YIm8p30aU . Acessed in Jan, 28 th . Hilary Putnam on Functionalism.